Electron apps can accept fake secure websites due to compromised certificates
Some digital certificates used to prove a website is genuine were compromised. Attackers holding them could pose as a trusted server to apps built with Electron if they can intercept network traffic.
| Severity | CriticalCVSS 7.4 of 10 |
|---|---|
| Being exploited? | ReportedBy Cisco PSIRT, not officially confirmed yet |
| Fix available? | Yes45.0.0-beta.6, 44.9.1, 43.8.1, 42.11.16 · since 25 Oct 2026 |
| How sure is this? | Official, 5 sourcesBacked by an official source |
How the attack works simplified
- 1Attacker obtains certificateHolds a cert from compromised eMudhra intermediate
- 2Intercepts trafficSits on a network the app connects over
- 3Impersonates serverPresents the forged certificate during TLS
- 4Electron app trusts itUnpatched Electron does not block the certificate
- 5Data exposedTraffic read or altered by attacker
- ResultAttacker impersonates a trusted server to the app
What happened
Electron does not block eMudhra intermediate certificates that were compromised, in Chromium networking and Node.js tls, https and fetch. An attacker with such a certificate who can intercept traffic can impersonate a TLS server to an affected app.
Are you affected?
You are affected if you ship or run an Electron app on a vulnerable version and it makes TLS connections over a network an attacker could intercept.
| Package / product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| electron · npm | >= 45.0.0-alpha.1, < 45.0.0-beta.6 | 45.0.0-beta.6 |
| electron · npm | >= 44.0.0-alpha.1, < 44.9.1 | 44.9.1 |
| electron · npm | >= 43.0.0-alpha.1, < 43.8.1 | 43.8.1 |
| electron · npm | < 42.11.16 | 42.11.16 |
What to do
- Update Electron to 44.9.1, 43.8.1, 42.11.16 or 45.0.0-beta.6 (whichever matches your release line)
- Rebuild and redistribute your Electron app so end users receive the patched runtime
- Apps cannot work around this in code; the Electron update is required
Timeline
- 20 Oct 2026, 00:00 UTCPublicly disclosed
- 20 Oct 2026, 00:00 UTCReported by Debian DSA · Debian DSA
- 20 Oct 2026, 00:00 UTCReported by Rust Blog · Rust Blog
- 21 Oct 2026, 00:00 UTCReported by Debian DSA · Debian DSA
- 23 Oct 2026, 19:17 UTCReported by NVD · NVD
- 23 Oct 2026, 20:53 UTCReported by GitHub Advisory · GitHub Advisory
- 25 Oct 2026, 15:20 UTCCisco PSIRT reported on it · Cisco PSIRT
- 25 Oct 2026, 15:20 UTCSeverity raised to critical
Sources 6 reports, oldest first
Official vendor, government CERT or advisory database
- DSA-6572-1 ca-certificates - security updateDebian DSA · 20 Oct 2026, 00:00 UTC
- Announcing rustup 1.29.2Rust Blog · 20 Oct 2026, 00:00 UTC
- DSA-6573-1 firefox-esr - security updateDebian DSA · 21 Oct 2026, 00:00 UTC
- NVD23 Oct 2026, 19:17 UTC
- GitHub Advisory23 Oct 2026, 20:53 UTC
- Cisco Informational for Emergency Distrust of eMudhra Root and Intermediate Certificate AuthoritiesCisco PSIRT · 24 Oct 2026, 18:55 UTC
Technical details
- ID
- CVE-2026-115570 · GHSA-jr5w-w6x2-84p9 · ZR-65538afb
- CVSS
- 7.4 / 10
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation within 30 days
- Disclosed
- 20 Oct 2026, 00:00 UTC
- On Zero Radar
- before the radar started
- Last change
- 25 Oct 2026, 15:20 UTC
The plain-language parts and the attack diagram were written by an AI model (anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5) from the sources above. Facts like versions, exploitation and dates come from the sources themselves. How Zero Radar works