LiteLLM supply-chain attack stole CI secrets over at least 11 days
A popular AI developer tool was compromised by attackers who secretly ran programs that collected passwords and access keys from its build system. Anyone who installed a bad version of the package could have had their own credentials stolen
| Severity | CriticalSecurity incident |
|---|---|
| Being exploited? | ReportedBy Socket, The Record, not officially confirmed yet |
| What to do | Check exposureFind and remove litellm==1.107.0 and the malicious container image, then rotate all secrets that those installs or your CI could access. |
| How sure is this? | 3 independent sourcesSeveral independent publishers agree |
How the attack works simplified
- 1Master key leakedConfig file with key committed publicly in May
- 2Malicious workflowscache.yml ran secret-stealing jobs Oct 10-12
- 3Release pipeline hijackedAttacker published tampered package
- 4Users install bad versionlitellm==1.107.0 from PyPI and container image
- 5Secrets exfiltratedCI and user credentials sent to attacker
- ResultAttacker harvests credentials from many users
What happened
Malicious workflows at .github/workflows/cache.yml were committed to the BerriAI/litellm GitHub repository and ran successfully on October 10 and October 12, 2026, designed to collect and transmit CI secrets. This preceded the October 21 release-pipeline attack that published malicious litellm==1.107.0 packages to PyPI and a malicious container image. An earlier exposed master key, accidentally committed to a public repository in May 2026, reportedly let the attacker reach the release pipeline.
Are you affected?
You are affected if you installed litellm==1.107.0 from PyPI, pulled the malicious LiteLLM container image, or your organization's CI pipelines or GitHub tokens were connected to the BerriAI/litellm repository.
litellm==1.107.0 (PyPI wheels); malicious LiteLLM container image published October 21, 2026; BerriAI/litellm repository CI secrets during October 10-21, 2026.
What to do
- Check whether litellm==1.107.0 or the affected container image is installed anywhere and remove it.
- Rotate GitHub tokens, CI secrets, and any API keys that were available to LiteLLM's build or release pipelines.
- Revoke the leaked LiteLLM master key and confirm no other keys from the exposed configuration file remain active.
- Review GitHub Actions logs and repository history for unexpected cache.yml workflows or ci-tmp- branches.
Timeline
- 23 Oct 2026, 21:00 UTCPublicly disclosed
- 23 Oct 2026, 21:00 UTCReported by Socket · Socket
- 24 Oct 2026, 11:03 UTCReported by The Hacker News · The Hacker News
- 26 Oct 2026, 12:04 UTCThe Record reported on it · The Record
Sources 3 reports, oldest first
Security researchers research teams and mailing lists
- New Evidence Shows LiteLLM Secret-Stealing Workflows Ran 11 Days Before Supply Chain AttackSocket · 23 Oct 2026, 21:00 UTC
Security press established security newsrooms
- Leaked LiteLLM Master Key Let Attackers Steal GitHub Tokens and Hijack Release PipelineThe Hacker News · 24 Oct 2026, 11:03 UTC
- Popular AI tool LiteLLM says unrevoked key allowed hackers to target usersThe Record · 26 Oct 2026, 12:00 UTC
Technical details
- ID
- ZR-3baf29b2 · ZR-3a1a036e · ZR-680a1bde
- Disclosed
- 23 Oct 2026, 21:00 UTC
- On Zero Radar
- before the radar started
- Last change
- 26 Oct 2026, 12:04 UTC
The plain-language parts and the attack diagram were written by an AI model (anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5) from the sources above. Facts like versions, exploitation and dates come from the sources themselves. How Zero Radar works